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Abstract  The  objective  of  this  research  is  to  deepen  in  the  role  played  by  formal  institu-
tions on  the  different  types  of  entrepreneurship  (opportunity  and  necessity)  as  well  as  in  its
relative importance.  The  institutions  we  analyze  are  property  rights,  business  freedom,  ﬁscal
freedom,  labor  freedom,  ﬁnancial  capital  and  educational  capital.  Our  results  show  that,  in  gen-
eral, opportunity  entrepreneurship  beneﬁts  from  an  improvement  of  these  institutions,  while
necessity  entrepreneurship  is  damaged.  This  will  positively  inﬂuence  the  relative  presence  of
opportunity  entrepreneurship  that  is  usually  considered  to  be  of  greater  quality  and  is  moreGEM clearly related  to  economic  development  in  a  country.
© 2014  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ntrepreneurship  research  has  traditionally  argued  that
ntrepreneurial  activity  promotes  economic  growth  and
evelopment  (Minniti,  2008).  As  a  result,  we  can  observe
ow  public  policies  have  devoted  signiﬁcant  effort  to  pro-
ote  entrepreneurship  (Shane,  2009),  especially  since  the
eginning  of  the  current  economic  crisis,  as  it  is  consid-
red  one  of  the  drivers  that  can  help  improve  this  situation
Baumol  and  Strom,  2007;  Bjornskov  and  Foss,  2013;  Estrin
t  al.,  2013).  For  instance,  we  can  mention  the  Euro-
ean  Commission’s  Entrepreneurship  2020  Action  Plan,  or,
ithin  the  Spanish  framework,  Law  14/2013  to  promote∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: lfuente@unizar.es (L. Fuentelsaz).
M
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2015.02.001
340-9436/© 2014 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. Th
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ntrepreneurship  and  its  internationalization  as  examples
f  increasing  government  concern.
The  above  context,  together  with  the  empirical  evi-
ence  that  shows  considerable  differences  in  both  the
evels  and  types  of  entrepreneurship  (see,  for  example,
ttp://www.gemconsortium.org),  has  opened  a  stream  of
iterature  that  analyzes  the  factors  that  try  to  explain  these
ifferences  (Parker,  2004;  McMullen  et  al.,  2008;  Levie  and
utio,  2011).  One  of  the  most  common  frameworks  to  study
his  phenomenon  is  institutional  theory  (North,  1990).  This
heory  argues  that  the  environment  determines  not  only
ndividual  decision  to  become  an  entrepreneur,  but  also  the
haracteristics  of  new  ventures,  with  a  subsequent  effect
n  growth  levels  and  country  development  (Baumol,  1990;
inniti  and  Lévesque,  2008).
One  classiﬁcation  that  has  recently  acquired  some
mportance  in  categorizing  the  types  of  entrepreneurship
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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distinguishes  between  necessity  and  opportunity  (Reynolds
et  al.,  1999).  The  former  builds  on  a  difﬁcult  environment
that  gives  limited  opportunities,  while  the  latter  is  related
to  the  identiﬁcation  of  an  attractive  business  opportunity.
Recent  studies  have  conducted  a  generic  analysis  of  the
inﬂuence  of  the  institutional  environment  on  these  two
types  of  entrepreneurship  (McMullen  et  al.,  2008;  Valdez
and  Richardson,  2013)  as  also  occurs  with  other  taxonomies
(Levie  and  Autio,  2011;  Dau  and  Cuerzo-Cazurra,  2014).
However,  these  studies  do  not  assess  the  impact  of  for-
mal  institutions  on  the  different  types  of  entrepreneurship,
which  does  not  allow  any  conjecture  on  their  relative  impor-
tance.
This  is  particularly  important  when  more  entrepreneur-
ship  is  not  always  necessarily  considered  to  be  better
(Shane,  2009).  Some  entrepreneurial  activities,  for  exam-
ple,  are  not  related  to  growth  and  economic  development
(Baumol,  1990;  Wennekers  et  al.,  2005).  Acs  (2006)  and  Acs
et  al.  (2008)  argue  that  a  country’s  economic  development
will  improve  when  more  importance  is  placed  on  opportunity
entrepreneurship  rather  than  necessity  entrepreneurship.
This  means  that  as  agents  adopt  their  decisions  tak-
ing  into  account  environmental  factors,  an  institutional
context  encouraging  high-quality  entrepreneurship  allows
entrepreneurial  behavior  to  veer  toward  activities  leading
to  greater  economic  growth.
The  main  objective  of  this  research  is  to  analyze  and
to  compare  the  inﬂuence  that  the  formal  institutions  of  a
country  have  on  the  different  types  of  entrepreneurship  and
on  their  relative  presence.  Our  contribution  in  this  paper
is  twofold.  First,  we  add  some  empirical  evidence  on  the
discussion  on  how  institutions  affect  the  different  types
of  entrepreneurship.  We  conclude  that  formal  institutions
play  a  role  in  understanding  both  opportunity  and  neces-
sity  entrepreneurship.  Second,  and  more  importantly,  we
argue  that  the  relative  presence  of  opportunity  and  neces-
sity  entrepreneurship  is  inﬂuenced  by  the  characteristics  of
the  institutional  environment,  as  we  will  discuss  in  the  ﬁnal
section  of  the  paper.
This  article  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Literature  review
section,  we  provide  a  review  of  the  literature  on  the  types  of
entrepreneurship  as  well  as  on  formal  institutions.  We  also
develop  the  hypotheses  of  our  study.  In  Hypotheses  section,
we  describe  the  database,  variables  and  the  methodology,
while  Research  method  presents  the  empirical  results.  We
close  the  paper  by  discussing  its  main  ﬁndings  and  implica-
tions.
Literature review
Types  of  entrepreneurship
When  the  literature  distinguishes  between  different  types  of
entrepreneurship,  it  uses  a  wide  variety  of  terms:  innovators
versus  imitators  (Schumpeter,  1934);  productive  and  unpro-
ductive  entrepreneurship  (Baumol,  1990;  Baumol  and  Strom,
2007;  Minniti,  2008);  entrepreneurs  with  growth  aspirations
or  without  them  (Autio  and  Acs,  2010);  entrepreneur-
ship  directed  toward  high-growth  activities  (Bowen  and
De  Clercq,  2008;  Shane,  2009);  and  formal  and  informal
entrepreneurship  (Dau  and  Cuerzo-Cazurra,  2014).
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As  previously  mentioned,  one  taxonomy  has  gained  credit
n  the  last  decade  derived  from  the  seminal  studies  of  Shane
t  al.  (1991),  Reynolds  and  Miller  (1992)  and  Krueger  and
razeal  (1994)  and  was  eventually  consolidated  in  the  work
f  Reynolds  et  al.  (2003).  This  classiﬁcation  distinguishes
etween  opportunity  and  necessity  entrepreneurs.  The  ﬁrst
s  linked  to  the  identiﬁcation  of  good  business  opportuni-
ies,  while  the  second  starts  a  new  venture  because  of  the
ack  of  better  job  opportunities.  Although  it  is  true  that
oth  types  refer  to  new  entrepreneurial  activities,  their
ffects  on  development  and  economic  growth  are  clearly
ifferent.  In  previous  studies,  and  particularly  in  empir-
cal  analyses  based  on  GEM  data,  Reynolds  et  al.  (2003,
.  17)  ﬁnd  evidence  that  both  proﬁles  differ  systemati-
ally  in  (1)  expectations  of  job  creation,  (2)  projections
or  out-of-country  export  expectations,  (3)  intention  to
eplicate  existing  business  activities  versus  the  creation
f  a  new  niche,  and  (4)  market  share  in  different  busi-
ess  sectors.  Similarly,  Acs  and  Varga  (2005)  show  that
he  impact  on  growth  and  economic  development  of  both
ypes  of  entrepreneurship  varies  widely  whereas  necessity
ntrepreneurship  does  not  affect  economic  development,
nd  opportunity  entrepreneurship  has  a  positive  and  signif-
cant  effect.
Other  studies  have  also  taken  into  account  this  dichotomy
etween  opportunity  and  necessity  entrepreneurship.  Jaén
t  al.  (2013)  analyze  the  relationship  between  necessity
ntrepreneurship  and  the  economic  situation  of  a  country;
hen  it  is  better,  job  opportunities  rise  and,  consequently,
he  need  to  start  new  businesses  is  reduced;  but  the  con-
ext  is  quite  the  opposite  for  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
n  the  same  vein,  McMullen  et  al.  (2008)  use  this  clas-
iﬁcation  to  show  that  certain  institutions  inﬂuence  one
f  the  two  types  of  entrepreneurship,  but  not  the  other.
inally,  Wennekers  et  al.  (2005)  conclude  that  while  oppor-
unity  entrepreneurship  shows  a  positive  relation  with  a
ountry’s  per  capita  GDP  and  innovative  capacity,  necessity
ntrepreneurship  shows  a  negative  relation  between  these
ariables.
Other  research,  rather  than  assessing  opportunity
nd  necessity  entrepreneurship  separately,  analyses  them
ointly.  Acs  (2006)  or  Acs  et  al.  (2008)  conclude  that  the
ore  important  opportunity  entrepreneurship  is  in  relation
o  necessity  entrepreneurship,  the  larger  per  capita  GDP
nd  other  indicators  are  (the  percentage  of  exports  over
DP,  expenditure  on  R&D,  or  expenditure  on  education,
o  name  a  few  examples).  These  indicators  characterize
he  most  developed  countries,  leading  us  to  conclude  that
he  relative  level  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship  can  be
 good  indicator  of  a  country’s  economic  and  productive
evelopment  (Acs,  2006).  Lin˜an  et  al.  (2013)  insist  on  this
dea,  ﬁnding  a positive  relationship  between  the  opportu-
ity  entrepreneurship/necessity  entrepreneurship  ratio  and
er  capita  GDP.  In  short,  the  larger  the  population  involved
n  opportunity  entrepreneurship  (usually  of  a  higher  qual-
ty)  rather  than  necessity  entrepreneurship  (which  is  often
elf-employment),  the  higher  the  level  of  the  economic
evelopment  of  a country.A  review  of  the  previous  literature  raises  two  interest-
ng  implications.  On  the  one  hand,  when  comparing  the
ifferences  in  entrepreneurship  levels  between  geographic
reas,  it  is  important  to  separate  it  into  its  two  components
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opportunity  versus  necessity),  as  this  facilitates  the  moni-
oring  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship,  usually  considered
ore  attractive.  In  line  with  this  argument,  a  second  impli-
ation  is  that  for  a  given  entrepreneurship  rate,  the  analysis
f  the  relative  importance  of  both  dimensions  can  be  seen
s  an  indicator  that  approximates  the  level  of  economic
evelopment  of  a  country  or  a  region.
ormal  institutions
rom  an  overall  perspective,  entrepreneurship  has  been
nriched  by  four  big  approaches  (Verheul  et  al.,  2002;
eciana,  1999):  economic,  psychological,  organizational  and
ociological  or  institutional.  The  latter  approach  argues
hat  the  social  and  cultural  environment  determines  the
ndividual  decision  to  start  a  business  (Bruton  et  al.,
010).  Following  this  approach,  most  extant  research  has
aken  institutional  theory  as  the  theoretical  framework  to
xplain  the  differences  in  entrepreneurship  levels  between
ountries,  (North,  1990;  Fritsch  and  Storey,  2014;  Urbano
nd  Alvarez,  2014;  Dau  and  Cuerzo-Cazurra,  2014).  Most  of
his  research  understands  institutions  as  the  rules  of  the
ame  regulating  political,  social  and  economic  relationships
n  a  society,  providing  the  structure  and  order  for  exchanges
o  take  place,  reducing  risks  and  providing  human  inter-
ction  (North,  1990).  These  institutions  not  only  inﬂuence
he  level  of  entrepreneurship,  but  also  the  characteristics
nd  quality  of  entrepreneurship  initiatives,  by  making  them
ore  or  less  productive  (Bruton  et  al.,  2010;  Baumol,  1990).
A  well-established  distinction  differentiates  between  for-
al  and  informal  institutions  (North,  1990).  The  formal  ones
efer  to  the  political,  legal  and  economic  rules  designed
o  limit  individual  behavior  and  facilitate  exchanges,  while
nformal  institutions  include  behavior,  values  or  beliefs  in  a
ociety.
Formal  institutions  can  be  understood  in  a  very  broad
ense.  In  this  paper,  we  closely  follow  Gnyawali  and  Fogel
1994).1 These  authors  identify  a  series  of  environment
imensions  that  are  important  from  the  point  of  view  of
ntrepreneurship:  (1)  government  policies  and  procedures;
2)  socioeconomic  conditions;  (3)  entrepreneurial  and  busi-
ess  skills;  (4)  ﬁnancial  and  non-ﬁnancial  assistance.  The
urpose  of  government  policies  should  be  to  guarantee  that
he  mechanisms  of  the  market  work  efﬁciently  by  eliminat-
ng  market  failures  and  possible  administrative  rigidities,
ll  with  the  goal  of  creating  a  context  that  allows  com-
anies  to  assume  reasonable  risks  in  the  running  of  their
usiness.  In  this  ﬁrst  dimension,  we  identify  three  rele-
ant  institutions:  property  rights,  business  freedom  and
abor  freedom.  As  regards  socioeconomic  conditions,  the
ork  mentioned  above  includes  the  attitudes  of  society  and
overnments  toward  entrepreneurial  activities,  a  necessary
spect  to  motivate  people  to  start  a  new  business.  An  impor-
ant  factor  in  this  second  block  refers  to  the  level  of  taxes
ntrepreneurs  sustain.  This  element  can  be  approached
hrough  ﬁscal  freedom.  Technical  and  business  education,
1 This classiﬁcation has been used recently, for example by Álvarez
t al. (2014), in a study that tries to systematize the whole investi-
ation performed with GEM data.
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ntrepreneurial  training  programs  or  the  availability  of
nformation  in  a society  are  included  in  entrepreneurial  and
usiness  skills.  It  is,  therefore,  a  set  of  indicators  clearly
inked  to  this  society’s  educational  capital.  Finally,  con-
erning  ﬁnancial  and  non-ﬁnancial  assistance,  we  emphasize
ccess  to  credit  in  an  economy,  which  is  much  needed  to
oth  initiate  an  entrepreneurial  activity  and  to  make  it  grow
r  expand.  Financial  freedom  is  an  institution  clearly  related
o  credit  availability.
ypotheses
roperty  rights
 key  element  for  effective  business  transactions  is  property
ights.  This  is  one  of  the  fundamental  institutions  of  any  gov-
rnment  because  it  guarantees  appropriate  incentives  for
ntrepreneurs  by  compensating  them  for  the  positive  bene-
ts  they  generate  for  society  (Baumol,  1990).  The  so-called
ule  of  law  would  be  included  in  this  regulatory  protection;
t  includes  not  only  regulation,  but  also  effective  enforce-
ent  (North,  1986;  Bowen  and  De  Clercq,  2008).  Levie  and
utio  (2011)  underline  that  the  rule  of  law  is  the  factor  that
revents  any  potential  expropriations  that  entrepreneurs
ay  suffer;  otherwise  existing  regulations  would  be  simply
gnored.
In  this  spirit,  North  (1986)  and  Bjornskov  and  Foss  (2013)
rgue  that  a  well-deﬁned  legal  system,  a  judiciary  system
hat  implements  these  laws  impartially,  and  a  set  of  atti-
udes  toward  hiring  and  commerce  that  encourage  people
o  hire  and  perform  transactions  at  a  reasonable  cost  are
ssential  for  the  economic  growth  of  a  country.  Therefore,
t  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  more  regulatory  pro-
ection  will  promote  all  types  of  entrepreneurship,  since
t  will  allow  businesses  to  operate  more  safely  and  better
alibrate  the  expected  proﬁt  as  a  result.  Both  opportunity
nd  necessity  entrepreneurship  will  obtain  advantages  from
n  environment  that  provides  an  appropriate  protection  of
roperty  rights.
If  we  distinguish  the  consequences  of  this  institution
n  the  different  types  of  entrepreneurship,  we  can  see
hat  opportunity  entrepreneurs,  by  having  more  growth
r  employment  aspirations  (Reynolds  et  al.,  2003;  Hessels
t  al.,  2008),  risk  more  capital  (Levie  and  Autio,  2011;  Estrin
t  al.,  2013).  These  investments  (whether  in  machinery,
atent  development  or  other  assets)  are  at  risk  without  a
ood  protection  of  property  rights  (Aidis  et  al.,  2008).  In
his  context,  a  potential  opportunity  entrepreneur  has  more
o  lose  than  an  entrepreneur  who  only  seeks  survival  (Levie
nd  Autio,  2011).  Similarly,  a  good  system  of  protection  of
roperty  rights  will  promote  innovative  behaviors  and  risk-
aking  (Bjornskov  and  Foss,  2013),  behaviors  that  are  more
enerally  present  in  opportunity  entrepreneurs  (Hessels
t  al.,  2008).  As  a result,  the  relative  presence  of  oppor-
unity  entrepreneurship  will  beneﬁt  more  than  necessity
ntrepreneurship  in  this  context.  The  above  considerations
ead  us  to  propose  the  following  hypotheses:1a.  A  higher  level  of  protection  of  property  rights  has  a
ositive  effect  on  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
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H1b.  A  higher  level  of  protection  of  property  rights  has  a
positive  effect  on  necessity  entrepreneurship.
H1c.  A  higher  level  of  protection  of  property  rights
has  a  positive  effect  on  the  relative  presence  of  oppor-
tunity  entrepreneurship  in  comparison  with  necessity
entrepreneurship.
Business  freedom
Another  key  element  that  facilitates  entrepreneurship  is
business  freedom,  which  makes  reference  to  the  simpliﬁca-
tion  of  all  the  administrative  processes  that  entrepreneurs
have  to  face,  not  only  to  begin  their  activity,  but  also
throughout  the  life  of  the  business  (OECD,  2001;  Heckelman,
2000).  Previous  studies  have  argued  that  regulatory  com-
plexity  damages  business  freedom  and  is  an  additional
obstacle  at  the  beginning  of  a  business  (Spencer  and  Gómez,
2004;  Levie  and  Autio,  2011).  Grilo  and  Thurik  (2005)  show
that  the  perception  people  have  of  administrative  com-
plexity  reduces  the  likelihood  of  embarking  on  a  business
activity.  Similarly,  Klapper  et  al.  (2006)  argue  that  a  higher
level  of  administrative  requirements  damages  the  creation
of  business  by  acting  as  an  important  barrier  to  entry.  There-
fore,  we  understand  that  more  administrative  simpliﬁcation
promotes  all  kinds  of  entrepreneurship,  both  opportunity
and  necessity.
When  comparing  the  effect  that  business  freedom  has  on
the  different  types  of  entrepreneurship,  it  is  useful  to  turn
to  the  signaling  theory  (Spence,  1973).  From  this  point  of
view,  if  regulation  at  entry  is  demanding  and  administrative
requirements  are  complex,  the  signal  sent  to  entrepreneurs
is  that  the  new  initiatives  they  start  are  subject  to  penalties
(Levie  and  Autio,  2011).  Nevertheless,  this  signal  will  not
necessarily  be  too  signiﬁcant  for  necessity  entrepreneurs,
since  they  are  more  concerned  about  their  survival  than
about  any  penalties  they  could  be  subject  to  (Bosma  et  al.,
2009).
Such  arguments  have  been  conﬁrmed  by  Djankov  et  al.
(2002),  among  others.  In  countries  with  more  demand-
ing  entry  regulations  (in  other  words  with  less  business
freedom),  the  weight  of  the  informal  economy  is  substan-
tially  greater,  as  many  businesses  prefer  to  operate  without
registering  or  regularizing  their  situation  to  avoid  costly  reg-
ulations.  These  requirements  are  more  difﬁcult  for  large
companies  to  ignore,  since  they  have  greater  visibility  and
it  is  not  easy  for  them  to  escape  from  governmental  control
(Dau  and  Cuerzo-Cazurra,  2014).  Furthermore,  as  the  busi-
ness  grows,  entrepreneurs  usually  take  on  more  personal
commitments,  which  increase  the  incentives  to  regularize
their  situation  to  beneﬁt  from  the  limited  liability  that
non-registered  businesses  lack  (Levie  and  Autio,  2011).  This
means  that  entrepreneurs  with  more  growth  aspirations
have  more  incentives  to  comply  with  regulations.  As  the
entrepreneurship  with  higher  growth  aspirations  is  opportu-
nity  entrepreneurship  (Reynolds  et  al.,  2003;  Shane  et  al.,
1991),  we  understand  that  it  will  beneﬁt  more  from  greater
business  freedom.  Accordingly,  these  arguments  lead  us  to
propose  the  following  set  of  hypotheses:
H2a.  A  higher  level  of  business  freedom  impacts  positively
on  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
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2b.  A  higher  level  of  business  freedom  impacts  positively
n  necessity  entrepreneurship.
2c.  A  higher  level  of  business  freedom  impacts  positively
n  the  relative  presence  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship  in
omparison  with  necessity  entrepreneurship.
iscal  freedom
iscal  freedom  measures  the  extent  to  which  governments
llow  individuals  and  businesses  to  manage  and  preserve
heir  incomes  and  wealth  for  their  own  beneﬁt  and  use,  and
t  is  determined  by  the  tax  level  imposed  on  entrepreneurs.
ean  and  McMullen  (2007)  emphasize  that  overtaxation
akes  entrepreneurs  feel  squeezed  by  the  Government  and,
onsequently,  demotivates  them.  Additionally,  net  proﬁts
ay  not  compensate  the  effort  needed  to  start  the  business.
long  the  same  lines,  some  researchers,  such  as  McMullen
t  al.  (2008)  and  Bowen  and  De  Clercq  (2008), insist  on  the
egative  effect  of  taxation  on  a  society’s  entrepreneurial
ehavior.  We  can  also  add  the  demotivating  effect  of  the
dministrative  effort  needed  when  tax  payment  procedures
re  complex  (Djankov  et  al.,  2002).
A  greater  burden  of  tax,  or  lower  ﬁscal  freedom,  is  gen-
rally  associated  with  a  larger  public  sector.  As  it  grows,
t  occupies  economic  areas  of  the  private  sector,  leaving
hem  less  room  to  act  (Estrin  et  al.,  2013).  More  public
ctivity  diverts  resources  from  the  private  sector  to  the  pub-
ic  sector,  thus  negatively  inﬂuencing  the  performance  of
ntrepreneurial  activity  (McMullen  et  al.,  2008). All  these
onsiderations  lead  us  to  propose  that  more  ﬁscal  freedom
ill  have  a  positive  effect  on  both  types  of  entrepreneur-
hip.
One  of  the  differences  between  the  two  types  of
ntrepreneurship  is  that  necessity  entrepreneurship  is  by
ature  imitative  (Hessels  et  al.,  2008;  McMullen  et  al.,
008).  Necessity  entrepreneurs  are,  therefore,  less  likely  to
njoy  the  income  associated  with  innovation  (Schumpeter,
934) and  their  margins  will  be  lower  than  opportunity
ntrepreneurs’  margins.  This  makes  necessity  entrepreneur-
hip  especially  sensitive  to  tax  increases  (McMullen  et  al.,
008) and  means  that  more  ﬁscal  freedom  will  favor  neces-
ity  entrepreneurship  proportionally  more.
3a.  More  ﬁscal  freedom  impacts  positively  on  opportunity
ntrepreneurship.
3b.  More  ﬁscal  freedom  impacts  positively  on  necessity
ntrepreneurship.
3c.  More  ﬁscal  freedom  impacts  negatively  on  the
elative  presence  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship  in  com-
arison  with  necessity  entrepreneurship.
abor  freedom
ome  governments  establish  very  thorough  regulations  of
abor  relations  between  employers  and  employees  to  protect
he  latter  by  putting  in  place  restrictions  ranging  from  salary
etermination  to  stipulations  for  working  conditions  or
ompensation  in  case  of  dismissal  (World  Economic  Forum,
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013).  When  this  type  of  rigidity  exists,  entrepreneurs’
apacity  to  negotiate  salary  and  working  conditions  is
imited,  thus  preventing  them  from  assigning  resources  to
he  uses  they  consider  to  be  more  productive  (McMullen
t  al.,  2008).  Furthermore,  these  restrictions  in  labor  legis-
ation  are  accompanied  by  a  large  number  or  requirements
hat  must  be  met,  acting  as  a  barrier  to  entry  (Djankov  et  al.,
002).  Considering  the  importance  that  entrepreneurs  give
o  controlling  their  activity  (Mueller  and  Thomas,  2001),
abor  legislation  restrictions  can  demotivate  and  result  in
 decrease  in  the  level  of  entrepreneurship.
When  distinguishing  between  types  of  entrepreneurship,
n  a  highly  regulated  labor  market,  the  self-employed  (and
pportunity  entrepreneurs  usually  are)  will  have  fewer
ncentives  to  leave  their  jobs  given  the  higher  opportunity
ost  (Levie  and  Autio,  2011;  McMullen  et  al.,  2008).  There-
ore,  opportunity  entrepreneurship  is  damaged  by  more
abor  rigidity.  However,  this  reasoning  does  not  apply  to
ecessity  entrepreneurship,  since  other  market  alternatives
re  scarce.
Furthermore,  opportunity  entrepreneurs  usually  have
ore  growth  aspirations,  which  means  they  anticipate  hir-
ng  more  workers  than  necessity  entrepreneurs  (Reynolds
t  al.,  2003).  The  more  employees  entrepreneurs  intend
o  hire,  the  more  ﬂexible  labor  legislation  will  work  in
heir  favor  (Roman  et  al.,  2013).  This  again  leads  us  to
onclude  that  labor  freedom  positively  inﬂuences  opportu-
ity  entrepreneurship.  However,  if  entrepreneurs  have  no
lans  to  hire  employees  (as  is  often  the  case  of  neces-
ity  entrepreneurship,  Reynolds  et  al.,  2003),  they  will  not
uffer  from  the  rigidity  of  the  legislation.  More  precisely,
oman  et  al.  (2013)  claim  that  a  rigid  labor  market  pro-
otes  entrepreneurs  without  employees,  since  hiring  costs
re  hard  to  meet;  this  discourages  hiring  and  encourages
he  existence  of  smaller  companies.  Moreover,  given  the
ature  of  necessity  entrepreneurship----often  seen  as  the  last
pportunity  in  the  absence  of  alternatives  (Reynolds  et  al.,
005)----it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  more  labor  freedom
ncourages  hiring  in  the  market;  this  increases  the  range
f  possibilities,  with  the  subsequent  deterrent  effect  on
ecessity  entrepreneurship.  Therefore,  more  labor  freedom
ight  have  a  negative  inﬂuence  on  the  level  of  necessity
ntrepreneurs  in  a  society.  This  reasoning  leads  us  to  propose
he  following  hypotheses:
4a.  More  labor  freedom  impacts  positively  on  opportunity
ntrepreneurship.
4b.  More  labor  freedom  impacts  negatively  on  necessity
ntrepreneurship.
4c.  More  labor  freedom  impacts  positively  on  the  relative
resence  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship  in  comparison
ith  necessity  entrepreneurship.
inancial  capitalt  is  generally  recognized  that  entrepreneurs  founding  a
usiness  are  particularly  vulnerable  to  ﬁnancial  restrictions.
ecause  of  their  limited  personal  wealth,  they  often  need
nancing  to  start  up  (Blanchﬂower  and  Oswald,  1998).  Levie
d
c
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nd  Autio  (2008)  argue  that  ﬁnancing  is  the  institution  car-
ying  more  weight  in  allocating  effort  for  entrepreneurial
ctivity,  since  it  is  usually  an  important  barrier  to  estab-
ishing  a  business.  In  fact,  the  last  World  Economic  Forum
eport  (2013)  determines  that  access  to  credit  is  one  of  the
ain  difﬁculties  people  trying  to  start  a  business  face.  As
chumpeter  (1934)  mentions,  credit  is  an  essential  precursor
o  business  activity.
The  ease  of  access  to  credit  is  usually  associated  with
ore  ﬁnancial  freedom,  which  includes  measures  such  as
ccess  to  ﬁnancial  services,  easy  access  to  loans,  the
olvency  of  banks  or  legislation  on  the  protection  of  a
ompany’s  shareholders  (World  Economic  Forum,  2013).
he  more  developed  ﬁnancial  markets  are,  the  easier
ccess  to  credit  becomes,  and  this  encourages  any  type  of
ntrepreneurial  activity.
However,  ﬁnancial  restrictions  can  have  more  inﬂuence
n  entrepreneurs  needing  a  larger  initial  capital  to  start
heir  business,  since  they  are  more  likely  to  request  exter-
al  ﬁnance.  Bowen  and  De  Clercq  (2008)  emphasize  that  the
evelopment  of  venture  capital  ﬁrms  is  especially  impor-
ant  to  ﬁnance  high-growth  projects,  with  higher  risk  levels
nd  links  to  new  technologies.  Therefore,  entrepreneurs
ith  higher  growth  aspirations  or  a more  innovative  business
opportunity  entrepreneurs)  will  be  more  affected  by  ﬁnan-
ial  restrictions  (Reynolds  et  al.,  2003;  Hessels  et  al.,  2008).
asier  access  or  more  ﬁnancial  capital  especially  encourages
pportunity  entrepreneurs,  which  positively  inﬂuences  their
elative  presence.  Consequently,
5a.  More  ﬁnancial  freedom  impacts  positively  on  oppor-
unity  entrepreneurship.
5b.  More  ﬁnancial  freedom  impacts  positively  on  neces-
ity  entrepreneurship.
5c.  More  ﬁnancial  freedom  impacts  positively  on  the
elative  presence  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship  in  com-
arison  with  necessity  entrepreneurship.
ducational  capital
he  last  dimension  we  consider  is  related  to  entrepreneurial
nd  business  skills  (Gnyawali  and  Fogel,  1994).  In  this  paper,
hey  are  associated  with  educational  capital,  an  institution
hat  clearly  affects  a  country’s  business  activity  (Glaeser
t  al.,  2004).  In  particular,  Reynolds  et  al.  (1999)  argue  that
 country’s  level  of  entrepreneurial  activity  is  related  to
nvestments  in  higher  education.  Given  that  education  can
rovide  people  with  a  greater  sense  of  independence  as  well
s  the  necessary  skills  to  ﬁnd  a  business  opportunity  (Bowen
nd  De  Clercq,  2008;  Jiménez  et  al.,  2015;  Verheul  et  al.,
002),  its  inﬂuence  will  be  more  signiﬁcant  in  opportunity
ntrepreneurship.  In  the  same  vein,  Levie  and  Autio  (2008)
nderscore  that  education  plays  a  very  important  role  to
etect  opportunities  in  the  market,  and  they  emphasize  that
ducational  capital  is  the  main  resource  entrepreneurs  rely
n  when  beginning  an  entrepreneurial  activity.Some  researchers  have  highlighted  the  importance  of
istinguishing  between  general  education  and  speciﬁc  edu-
ation  (Bowen  and  De  Clercq,  2008;  Jiménez  et  al.,  2015);
he  latter  focuses  on  promoting  speciﬁc  skills  to  undertake
essi
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a  business.  For  this  reason,  an  educational  system  that  pays
more  attention  to  entrepreneurship  will  have  more  possibil-
ities  of  teaching  the  skills  entrepreneurs  need,  such  as  the
ability  to  design  growth  strategies  in  their  ventures  (Levie
and  Autio,  2008).  This  kind  of  education  is  very  useful  for
opportunity  entrepreneurs  because  they  have  more  growth
perspectives  (Reynolds  et  al.,  2003).
Some  arguments  posit  that  more  educational  capital  may
harm  necessity  entrepreneurship.  This  is  the  reasoning  of
Malchow-Moller  et  al.  (2010),  who  present  a  model  in  which
two  groups  of  entrepreneurs  coexist:  the  ﬁrst  have  a  high
education  level  and  renounce  a  ﬁxed  salary  with  the  expec-
tation  of  obtaining  a  higher  reward  by  establishing  their
own  venture;  the  second  have  a  lower  educational  level
and  choose  the  entrepreneurial  path  because  they  did  not
attain  the  necessary  performance  to  ﬁnd  a  wage-earning
job.  This  second  group  ﬁts  clearly  in  the  deﬁnition  of  neces-
sity  entrepreneurship.  For  this  reason,  following  the  model
presented  by  Malchow-Moller  et  al.  (2010),  we  can  assume
that  if  a  society’s  educational  capital  increases,  the  level
of  necessity  entrepreneurship  would  drop  because  these
people  would  have  the  education  they  need  to  obtain  a
wage-earning  job,  so  they  would  never  be  forced  to  create
a  company.  This  discussion  leads  us  to  propose  the  following
hypotheses:
H6a.  More  educational  capital  impacts  positively  on  oppor-
tunity  entrepreneurship.
H6b.  More  educational  capital  impacts  negatively  on
necessity  entrepreneurship.
H6c.  More  educational  capital  impacts  positively  on  the
presence  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship  in  comparison
with  necessity  entrepreneurship.
Research method
Sample
Our  hypotheses  were  tested  in  a  wide  sample  of  63
countries  that  have  participated  at  least  once  in  the  Global
Entrepreneurship  Monitor  (GEM)2 project  between  2005  and
2012,3 and  for  which  we  have  information  on  all  the  analy-
sis  variables.  The  ﬁnal  sample  is  a  non-balanced  panel  (some
countries  only  participated  in  the  project  one  or  two  years
between  2005  and  2012)  with  189  observations.
One  of  the  primary  objectives  of  the  GEM  project  is  to
assess  the  role  played  by  entrepreneurs  on  economic  growth
2 GEM arose from the collaboration between the London Busi-
ness School and The Babson College in the 1990s. Initially only
10 countries participated in the project, but over the years new
countries have joined in (sometimes in a discontinuous fashion). As
a consequence, we have information on a wide range of countries
worldwide.
3 It can be argued that the recent economic crisis has inﬂuenced
our results and, therefore, the time frame considered can offer a
false vision of this phenomenon. In order to rule out this possibility,
we have undertaken a separate analysis for two periods: 2005--2007,
and 2008--2012, with very similar results.
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Reynolds  et  al.,  2005)  by  harmonizing  data  on  the  level  and
ature  of  new  ventures  in  every  country.  Initially,  the  most
mportant  target  was  policymakers,  but  the  coverage  and
igor  of  the  data  showed  that  they  can  be  useful  for  aca-
emic  purposes  (Álvarez  et  al.,  2014).  As  a  result,  there
re  a  growing  number  of  research  articles  using  the  GEM  as
 data  source  (see  Bowen  and  De  Clercq,  2008;  Levie  and
utio,  2011;  McMullen  et  al.,  2008; among  others).  In  our
ase,  GEM  is  an  ideal  tool  because  it  presents  a large  num-
er  of  countries,  a  wide  time  horizon  and  the  possibility  of
ifferentiating  between  types  of  entrepreneurship.
ariables
ependent  variables
EM  approaches  entrepreneurship  in  a  country  through  an
ndex  known  as  Total  Entrepreneurial  Activity  (TEA).  It  meas-
res  the  percentage  of  the  adult  population  (aged  between
8  and  64)  who  had  initiated  a  venture  in  the  last  42
onths.4 One  of  the  advantages  of  this  study  is  that  it
sks  about  the  reasons  for  creating  the  company,  distin-
uishing  between  people  involved  in  a  new  venture  because
f  the  identiﬁcation  of  a  market  opportunity  (opportu-
ity  entrepreneurship),  people  involved  in  entrepreneurship
ecause  they  had  no  other  option  for  work  (necessity
ntrepreneurship),  and  people  with  other  reasons.  Among
he  ﬁrst  group,  GEM  distinguishes  between  those  who  create
 new  venture  to  be  independent  or  increase  their  income,
nd  those  who  just  wish  to  maintain  their  incomes.
Our  approximation  takes  into  account  this  framework,
o  we  estimate  the  model  considering  three  dependent
ariables.  TEA  opportunity, deﬁned  as  the  percentage  of
ndividuals  involved  in  entrepreneurship  because  of  the
dentiﬁcation  of  an  appealing  business  opportunity;  TEA
ecessity,  deﬁned  as  the  percentage  of  individuals  who
reate  the  new  ﬁrm  because  they  have  no  better  work
lternatives;  and  ﬁnally,  the  TEA  opportunity/TEA  necessity
atio,  which  measures  the  relative  importance  of  both  types
f  initiatives.  A  higher  value  of  this  indicator  shows  a  rela-
ive  increase  in  new  ventures  beginning  to  take  advantage
f  a  business  opportunity.  Some  previous  studies  have  used
he  same  measures  in  their  empirical  analysis  (McMullen
t  al.,  2008;  Valdez  and  Richardson,  2013;  Amorós,  2009;
in˜an  et  al.,  2013).
ndependent  variables
oncerning  independent  variables,  we  usually  use  the  infor-
ation  provided  by  the  Heritage  Foundation  and,  more
peciﬁcally,  the  data  of  the  Index  of  Economic  Freedom
IEF).  Nevertheless,  the  information  on  the  expend  in  edu-
ation  is  provided  by  the  World  Bank  (WB).  Business  freedom
ries  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  governments  help  peo-
le  manage  the  outcome  of  their  work  and  efforts,  and  it
as  been  previously  used  in  research  to  measure  a  coun-
ry’s  level  of  institutional  development  (McMullen  et  al.,
4 GEM also provides data on people that intend to undertake a
enture in the near future (potential entrepreneurs) or that have
tarted an activity in the last 42 months (consolidated companies).
evertheless, these initiatives are beyond the scope of our study.
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Table  1  Description  of  the  variables  and  data  sources.
Dimension  Variable  Description  Source
Dependent  variables 1.  TEA  opportunity Percentage  of  those  people  involved  in  TEA  (Total
Entrepreneurship  Activity)  who  claim  to  be  driven  by
opportunity  and  who  indicate  the  main  driver  for  being
involved  in  this  opportunity  as  being  independent  or
increasing  their  income.
GEM
2. TEA  necessity  Percentage  of  those  people  involved  in  TEA  (Total
Entrepreneurship  Activity)  who  are  involved  in
entrepreneurship  because  they  had  no  other  option  for
work.
GEM
3. TEA  opportunity/TEA  necessity Ratio  between  TEA  opportunity  and  TEA  necessity. GEM
Independent
variables
4. Property  rights Property  rights  protection  across  judicial  systems
against  theft  and  expropriation.
IEF
5. Business  freedom  Measure  of  freedom  to  establish  a  company  and  to  run  it
without  interference.
IEF
6. Fiscal  freedom Measure  of  a  country’s  tax  level. IEF
7. Labor  freedom People’s  freedom  to  work  where  they  want  and  business
freedom  to  hire  and  ﬁre  workers  as  appropriate  to  the
circumstances.
IEF
8. Financial  capital  Measure  of  transparency  and  efﬁciency  to  access
ﬁnance.
IEF
9. Educational  capital  Total  expenditure  on  education  as  a  percentage  of  GDP.  WB
Control variables 10.  GDP  growth  Annual  rate  of  growth  of  GDP  at  market  rates.  WB
11. Unemployment  Percentage  of  the  active  population  out  of  work,  but
seeking  employment  and  available  to  perform  a  job.
WB
12. Population  growth  Demographic  growth  in  annual  percentage.  WB
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008;  Estrin  and  Mickiewicz,  2010;  Aidis  et  al.,  2012;  Dau
nd  Cuerzo-Cazurra,  2014;  Garrido  et  al.,  2014).  A  high
alue  of  this  variable  is  associated  with  strong  institu-
ions,  where  transactions  are  supported  by  mechanisms  that
uarantee  their  transparency  and  predictability.  The  Her-
tage  Foundation  considers  10  dimensions,  ﬁve  of  which  are
ssociated  with  our  reasoning  of  the  hypotheses  1--5.  The
elected  dimensions  are  property  rights, business  freedom,
scal  freedom,  labor  freedom  and  ﬁnancial  capital. Each
ountry  is  measured  in  each  of  the  dimensions  in  a  scale
etween  0  and  100  points.  The  interpretation  of  a  country’s
core  is  as  follows:  free  (100--80),  mostly  free  (79.9--70),
oderately  free  (69.9--60),  mostly  unfree  (59.9--50)  and
epressed  (49.9--0).  Regarding  the  educational  capital  vari-
ble  (hypothesis  6),  it  measures  the  total  expenditure  on
ducation  of  educational  institutions,  educational  adminis-
rations,  subsidies  and  transfers  to  private  entities  from  the
overnment  and  it  is  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  GDP.
ontrol  variables
he  model  includes  some  control  variables  that  may  inﬂu-
nce  the  level  of  entrepreneurship  in  a  country  and  that
ave  been  previously  used  in  the  literature.  Speciﬁcally,  we
ontrol  for  GDP,  unemployment  and  population  growth,  all
btained  from  the  World  Bank.We  use  GDP  growth  as  a  proxy  of  the  level  of  a  country’s
conomic  activity.  It  is  deﬁned  as  the  annual  growth  rate  as
 percentage  of  GDP  at  constant  prices  in  local  currency.
any  previous  studies  have  identiﬁed  a  positive  relation
A
t
s
peconomic freedom.
etween  GDP  growth  and  entrepreneurship  (Carree  et  al.,
002;  Bowen  and  De  Clercq,  2008).  Our  analysis  also  takes
nto  account  the  unemployment  rate,  a  variable  that  clearly
nﬂuences  the  creation  of  new  ventures,  especially  during
conomic  crisis.  The  literature  establishes  that  unemploy-
ent  has  a  negative  impact  on  opportunity  entrepreneurship
ecause  there  are  fewer  business  opportunities  in  times  of
risis,  and  a  positive  impact  on  necessity  entrepreneurship
ecause  there  are  fewer  options  to  ﬁnd  a  job  in  such  periods,
o  people  are  forced  by  circumstances  to  create  new  compa-
ies  (Verheul  et  al.,  2002;  Spencer  and  Gómez,  2004).  This
ariable  is  obtained  from  the  World  Bank.  Finally,  we  have
lso  included  population  growth,  a  demographic  measure
hat  provides  new  business  opportunities  due  to  the  expan-
ion  of  new  markets,  which  increases  entrepreneurs’  offer
Wennekers  et  al.,  2005;  Levie  and  Autio,  2008;  Autio  and
cs,  2010).
Table  1  summarizes  the  variables  used  in  the  empirical
nalysis  and  the  source  of  information  of  these  variables.
ata  analysis
ables  2  and  3  present  the  descriptive  statistics  and  the  cor-
elations  of  the  variables  used  in  the  analysis,  respectively.
s  shown  in  Table  2,  opportunity  entrepreneurship  is  higher
han  necessity  entrepreneurship,  whereas  the  variability  is
imilar  in  both  variables.  This  means  that,  on  average,  the
ercentage  of  ventures  started  as  a  consequence  of  good
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Table  2  Descriptive  statistics.
Variable  Mean  Stand.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum
1.  TEA  opportunity 52.9 11.8  23  82
2. TEA  necessity  21.1  11.3  3  48
3. TEA  opportunity/TEA  necessity  3.97  3.64  0.53  21.7
4. Property  rights  66.1  22.5  10  95
5. Business  freedom  77.6  12.8  47  100
6. Fiscal  freedom  66.8  14.1  33  93
7. Labor  freedom  64.9  15.6  29  100
8. Financial  capital  64.3  16.9  10  90
9. Educational  capital 5.10 1.26 1.8  8.74
10. GDP  growth 2.65 4.10 −18 12
11.  Unemployment 7.30 4.22 0.7 24.7
12.  Population  growth  0.84  0.73  −0.7  3.36
N = 189.
Table  3  Correlation  matrix.
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12
1.  TEA  opportunity  1
2.  TEA  necessity  −0.67* 1
3. TEA  opport./TEA
necessi.
0.69* −0.76* 1
4. Property  rights  0.52* −0.55* 0.50* 1
5. Business  freedom  0.44* −0.51* 0.50* 0.72* 1
6. Fiscal  freedom  −0.44* 0.48* −0.53* −0.50* −0.45* 1
7. Labor  freedom  0.18* −0.17* 0.22* 0.42* 0.33* −0.01  1
8. Financial  capital  0.34* −0.44* 0.36* 0.67* 0.55* −0.37* 0.40* 1
9. Educational  capital  0.39* −0.43* 0.57* 0.47* 0.54* −0.56* 0.06  0.33* 1
10. GDP  growth  −0.09  0.08  −0.06  −0.26* −0.32* 0.21* −0.06  −0.15* −0.34* 1
11. Unemployment  −0.40* 0.40* −0.38* −0.28* −0.22* 0.06  −0.23* −0.22* −0.06  −0.15* 1
12. Population  growth −0.04  −0.01  0.02  −0.08  −0.10  0.18* 0.05  −0.03  −0.09  0.32* −0.12  1
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i* p < 0.05, N = 189.
opportunity  identiﬁcation  is  clearly  higher.  This  is  also  clear
from  the  ratio  between  opportunity  entrepreneurship  and
necessity  entrepreneurship.  This  indicator  takes  a  value
close  to  4,  thus  indicating  that  for  every  entrepreneur  who
undertakes  a  venture  forced  by  circumstances,  there  are
four  new  ventures  trying  to  take  advantage  of  a  market
opportunity.
In  relation  to  the  independent  variables,  all  obtained
from  the  Index  of  Economic  Freedom  (except  business
freedom)  show  values  of  around  65.  This  means  that  the
countries  in  our  sample  have  moderate  free  conditions  to
operate  in  the  market.  Nevertheless,  these  averages  hide
important  differences  among  countries.  Business  freedom
has  a  value  close  to  80,  which  suggests  a  high  degree  of  free-
dom  in  this  dimension.  Finally,  educational  capital  shows  an
average  of  5.1,  with  a  relatively  moderate  standard  devia-
tion  of  1.26.
Concerning  the  correlation  matrix  in  Table  3,  we  can
see  that  the  explanatory  variables  (proxies  of  formal  insti-
tutions)  have  high  correlations  in  most  cases.  This  could
suggest  a  potential  problem  of  multicollinearity  if  all  the
variables  are  included  in  the  same  regression  at  the  same
time.  For  this  reason  we  have  calculated  the  variance
i
ﬁ
b
vnﬂation  factor  (VIF)  that  shows  average  values  over  10,  a
hreshold  that  could  be  considered  the  limit  after  which  mul-
icollinearity  problems  can  affect  estimated  coefﬁcients.
he  main  consequence  of  this  situation  is  that  the  precision
f  the  estimated  coefﬁcients  of  the  correlated  variables  is
educed,  and  some  variables  that  would  be  normally  statis-
ically  relevant  can  lose  their  signiﬁcance  (Gujarati,  2004).
or  this  reason,  we  estimate  each  of  the  variables  separately
n  our  analysis  and  introduce  them  sequentially,  which  has
een  the  usual  practice  in  similar  works  (see,  for  example,
lapper  et  al.,  2006  or  Desai  et  al.,  2003).
esults
ables  4--6  show  the  coefﬁcients  of  random-effects  esti-
ates.  Fixed  effects  and  random  effects  are  the  most
ommon  alternatives  to  control  unobservable  heterogene-
ty.  Traditionally,  selecting  between  these  two  alternatives
s  based  on  the  Hausman  test.  Nevertheless,  a  preference  for
xed  effects  would  prevent  the  estimate  of  constant  varia-
les  over  time.  This  is  the  case  of  most  of  the  explanatory
ariables  in  our  model.  Institutional  dimensions  tend  to  be
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Table  4  Determining  factors  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Property  rights 0.20***
(0.06)
Business  freedom 0.25***
(0.09)
Fiscal  freedom −0.34***
(0.09)
Labor freedom 0.13*
(0.07)
Financial capital 0.16***
(0.06)
Educational capital 2.65**
(1.06)
GDP growth −0.38* −0.08  −0.19  −0.20  −0.32  −0.32  −0.24
(0.23) (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.26)
Unemployment −1.02*** −0.70*** −0.79*** −0.89*** −0.92*** −0.79*** −0.89***
(0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.25)
Population  growth 0.02  0.73  0.57  0.75  −0.03  0.45  0.49
(1.60) (1.37)  (1.43)  (1.38)  (1.59)  (1.47)  (1.45)
Times dummies  YES  YES** YES** YES* YES  YES* YES**
Constants 58.05*** 39.98*** 34.01*** 83.60*** 48.42*** 44.53*** 44.85***
(4.31)  (7.29)  (9.96)  (7.28)  (7.36)  (6.45)  (6.55)
N 189  189  189  189  189  189  189
R2 0.25  0.36  0.35  0.36  0.25  0.29  0.35
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
***
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Standard deviation in parentheses.
table  over  time  and  some  of  them  do  not  show  any  time
ariation.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  argued  that  the
andom-effects  model  is  the  best  alternative  (Holmes  et  al.,
013).  In  addition,  in  all  the  cases  we  have  considered,
obust  errors  to  autocorrelation  and  the  Breusch--Pagan  test
how  that  there  is  no  heteroskedasticity  in  the  models.  To
est  our  hypotheses,  we  created  three  groups  of  estimates,
ne  for  each  of  our  dependent  variables:  the  ﬁrst  refers  to
EA  opportunity,  the  second  to  TEA  necessity  and  the  last  to
he  TEA  opportunity/TEA  necessity  ratio.  Our  procedure  was
imilar  in  all  three  cases.  First,  we  estimated  a  model  with
nly  the  control  variables.  Later,  we  sequentially  introduced
he  proxies  of  the  formal  institutions  in  models  2--7.
Table  4  describes  regressions  related  to  opportunity
ntrepreneurship.  Regarding  the  control  variables,  unem-
loyment  presents  a  negative  and  statistically  signiﬁcant
oefﬁcient  in  all  models,  as  expected,  thus  conﬁrming  that  a
igher  rate  of  unemployment  in  a  country  is  associated  with
 lower  rate  of  new  ventures  starting  from  the  identiﬁcation
f  a  good  opportunity.  The  two  other  control  variables  (GDP
rowth  and  population  growth) are  not  statistically  signiﬁ-
ant  in  any  of  our  models  (the  only  exception  is  the  variable
DP  growth  in  the  model  where  we  include  only  the  control
ariables).
All  the  property  rights, business  freedom,  labor  free-
om,  ﬁnancial  capital  and  educational  capital  variables
resent  the  expected  signs.  In  addition,  all  the  coefﬁcients
re  statistically  signiﬁcant;  therefore,  we  can  accept
ypotheses  1a,  2a,  4a,  5a  and  6a.  The  only  coefﬁcient  that
p
l
a
toes  not  support  our  theoretical  approach  is  the  ﬁscal  free-
om  variable,  whose  sign  is  the  opposite,  as  we  expected;
his  does  not  give  support  to  hypothesis  3a.
As  a  consequence,  with  the  exception  of  ﬁscal  freedom,
igher  quality  formal  institutions  (more  property  rights  pro-
ection,  more  business  freedom,  more  labor  freedom,  more
nancial  capital  and  more  educational  capital)  have  a  posi-
ive  inﬂuence  on  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  Accordingly,
he  government  authorities  should  improve  the  quality  of
hese  dimensions  to  the  extent  that  there  are  positive  con-
equences  from  a  social  well-being  point  of  view.
Regarding  the  regressions  of  the  necessity  entrepreneur-
hip  (Table  5),  the  reasoning  is  similar.  Again,  the  only
tatistically  signiﬁcant  control  variable  is  unemployment,
ith  a  positive  sign  that  suggests  that  when  the  occupa-
ion  rate  diminishes,  the  level  of  entrepreneurs  undertaking
 venture  forced  by  circumstances  increases,  probably
ecause  it  is  the  only  choice  they  have.
Regarding  the  explanatory  variables,  the  only  two  signif-
cant  coefﬁcients  with  the  expected  sign  are  those  related
o  ﬁscal  freedom  (hypothesis  3b)  and  educational  capital
hypothesis  6b).  Therefore,  more  ﬁscal  freedom  increases
ecessity  entrepreneurship  as  the  expected  revenues  from
hese  initiatives  rise.  On  the  other  hand,  expenditure  on
ducation  negatively  affects  necessity  entrepreneurship,
robably  because  a  better-trained  workforce  has  better
abor  prospects.  In  this  context,  entrepreneurship  is  only
 choice  when  there  is  a  real  and  attractive  market  oppor-
unity  covering  an  actual  need  in  the  market.
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Table  5  Determining  factors  of  necessity  entrepreneurship.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Property  rights −0.21***
(0.04)
Business  freedom −0.26***
(0.06)
Fiscal  freedom 0.32***
(0.06)
Labor freedom −0.11
(0.07)
Financial  capital −0.15***
(0.06)
Educational  capital −2.22**
(0.90)
GDP growth 0.02  −0.24  −0.13  −0.11  −0.04  −0.03  −0.08
(0.21) (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)
Unemployment 1.05*** 0.73*** 0.83*** 0.93*** 0.97*** 0.83*** 0.94***
(0.25)  (0.21)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.23)  (0.23)
Population growth 2.01  1.07  1.32  1.17  2.05  1.53  1.42
(1.42) (1.20)  (1.25)  (1.36)  (1.43)  (1.32)  (1.31)
Times dummies  YES  YES*** YES*** YES** YES  YES*** YES***
Constants 7.00* 0  0  0  15.35** 0  0
(3.85) (0)  (0)  (0)  (7.12)  (0)  (0)
N 189  189  189  189  189  189  189
R2 0.23  0.37  0.38  0.39  0.24  0.33  0.36
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
***
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Standard deviation in parentheses.
The  coefﬁcients  of  property  rights, business  freedom
and  ﬁnancial  capital  (hypotheses  1b,  2b  and  5b,  respec-
tively)  show  opposite  effects  to  the  ones  we  expected,
while  the  labor  freedom  coefﬁcient  (hypothesis  4b)  is  not
statistically  signiﬁcant.  One  potential  explanation  could  be
the  nature  of  this  type  of  entrepreneurship.  As  mentioned
above,  necessity  entrepreneurship  arises  from  the  lack  of
labor  alternatives  in  the  market  and  it  is  viewed  as  the
only  option  to  survive.  In  these  circumstances,  it  is  under-
standable  that  entrepreneurs  do  not  pay  enough  attention  to
the  institutional  environment  and  begin  an  activity  regard-
less  of  the  conditions  such  a  venture  entails.  Our  results
are  consistent  with  the  previous  literature  on  necessity
entrepreneurship  (Valdez  and  Richardson,  2013;  McMullen
et  al.,  2008).
Finally,  Table  6  presents  the  regressions  with  the  TEA
opportunity/TEA  necessity  ratio  as  a  dependent  variable.
Concerning  the  control  variables,  unemployment  is  again
the  only  statistically  signiﬁcant  variable  in  all  the  models
and  it  presents  the  expected  negative  sign.  This  supports
the  assumption  that  a  high  rate  of  unemployment  increases
the  proportion  of  ventures  that  begin  as  a  result  of  a  lack  of
labor  alternatives.  The  GDP  growth  variable  is  signiﬁcant  in
some  estimations  (models  1,  5  and  6),  but  its  sign  is  opposite
to  the  one  we  expected.Concerning  the  variables  linked  with  our  theoretical
approach,  all  of  them  are  statistically  signiﬁcant  with  the
expected  sign;  therefore,  we  support  hypotheses  1c,  2c,  3c,
5c,  and  6c.  The  only  exception  is  the  labor  freedom  variable,
o
f
ahich  shows  the  expected  sign,  but  the  coefﬁcient  is  not
tatistically  signiﬁcant,  so  we  cannot  support  our  hypothesis
c.
More  property  rights  protection,  more  business  free-
om,  more  ﬁnancial  capital  and  more  educational  capital
ncrease  the  relative  presence  of  the  most  produc-
ive  entrepreneurship,  which  in  our  study  is  associated
ith  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  Similarly,  more  ﬁs-
al  freedom  increases  the  relative  presence  of  necessity
ntrepreneurship,  which,  as  we  explained,  has  minor  proﬁt
argins,  and  is  not  capable  of  withstanding  a  high  tax  bur-
en.  Concerning  labor  freedom,  although  the  sign  is  as
xpected,  it  is  not  statistically  signiﬁcant,  and,  therefore,
e  cannot  accept  hypothesis  4c.  One  possible  explanation
s  a  lower  importance  of  this  institution.
iscussion and conclusions
he  main  purpose  of  this  research  is  to  assess  the  inﬂuence
f  the  formal  institutions  of  a  country  on  different  types  of
ntrepreneurship,  paying  special  attention  to  the  relative
resence  of  opportunity  versus  necessity  entrepreneurship.
s  an  overall  assessment,  our  results  show  that  increased
evelopment  of  formal  institutions  positively  affects  both
pportunity  entrepreneurship  and  its  relative  presence.
Our  ﬁndings  on  opportunity  entrepreneurship  slightly  dif-
er  from  those  obtained  by  Valdez  and  Richardson  (2013)
nd  McMullen  et  al.  (2008), given  that  they  establish
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Table  6  Determining  factors  of  TEA  opportunity/TEA  necessity  ratio.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Property  rights 0.06***
(0.01)
Business  freedom 0.11***
(0.03)
Fiscal  freedom −0.12***
(0.03)
Labor freedom 0.04
(0.03)
Financial  capital 0.04**
(0.02)
Educational capital 1.40***
(0.35)
GDP growth −0.13*** −0.02  −0.03  −0.06  −0.11** −0.11** −0.05
(0.04) (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)
Unemployment −0.28*** −0.18*** −0.18*** −0.24*** −0.24*** −0.22*** −0.30***
(0.08)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.06)
Population  growth −0.02  0.18  0.23  0.28  −0.05  0.09  0.22
(0.43) (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.38)  (0.43)  (0.38)  (0.30)
Times dummies  YES  YES** YES** YES  YES  YES  YES**
Constants 5.01*** −0.85  −6.14*** 14.11*** 1.78  1.29  −1.19
(1.06) (1.23)  (2.19)  (2.83)  (2.18)  (1.60)  (1.30)
N 189  189  189  189  189  189  189
R2 0.24  0.35  0.40  0.43  0.25  0.29  0.50
** p < 0.05.
***
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Standard deviation in parentheses.
hat  the  majority  of  formal  institutions  harm  opportunity
ntrepreneurship.  Nevertheless,  our  results  are  in  line  with
hose  of  Bowen  and  De  Clercq  (2008)  and  Levie  and  Autio
2011),  where  increased  development  of  formal  institutions
ositively  affects  higher  quality  entrepreneurship.  This  hap-
ens  because  both  the  latter  and  our  research  use  qualiﬁed
easures  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship,  which  is  the  type
ost  favored  by  a  well-developed  institutional  framework.
n  this  case,  we  understand  by  opportunity  entrepreneurship
hose  initiatives  whose  declared  purpose  is  to  be  indepen-
ent  or  increase  entrepreneur’s  incomes.
Our  striking  result  concerning  ﬁscal  freedom  (that  it
egatively  affects  opportunity  entrepreneurship)  deserves
urther  analysis.  One  possible  explanation  is  that  higher
axes  lead  to  a  higher  state  investment  in  infrastructures,
n  an  effective  judicial  system  or  in  a  high  protection  of
ntellectual  property,  which,  eventually,  positively  affect
ntrepreneurs.  However,  we  should  approach  this  outcome
ith  care  and  it  should  not  be  interpreted  as  a  political  rec-
mmendation  to  promote  a  higher  tax  system  to  increase
pportunity  entrepreneurship.
If  we  focus  our  attention  on  the  TEA  opportunity/TEA
ecessity  ratio,  our  results  corroborate  that  more  property
ights  protection,  more  business  freedom,  more  ﬁnan-
ial  capital  and  more  educational  capital  positively  affect
his  ratio,  in  other  words,  they  increase  the  quality  of
ntrepreneurship.  On  the  other  hand,  lower  taxation  (more
scal  freedom)  increases  the  rate  of  venture  initiatives  that
nly  launch  small  businesses,  with  the  sole  purpose  of  ensur-
ng  the  subsistence  of  their  partners.
B
b
wOne  result  of  special  interest  stems  from  the  inﬂuence
f  educational  capital.  While  a  higher  education  positively
ffects  opportunity  entrepreneurship  and  its  relative  pres-
nce,  its  effect  on  necessity  entrepreneurship  is  quite  the
pposite.  In  short,  a  better-trained  workforce  has  better
pportunities  in  the  labor  market  and  entrepreneurs  only
reate  a  new  venture  if  they  detect  a  promising  market
pportunity.
The  inﬂuence  of  institutions  on  the  relative  presence  of
pportunity  versus  necessity  entrepreneurship  is  the  most
igniﬁcant  contribution  of  our  research.  Given  the  impor-
ance  of  this  distinction,  the  absence  of  studies  analyzing
his  phenomenon  is  quite  surprising  (Acs,  2006;  Acs  et  al.,
008;  Shane,  2009).  To  our  knowledge,  few  empirical  works
nalyze  or  compare  the  effects  the  same  institutions  have
n  different  types  of  entrepreneurship  (Levie  and  Autio,
011;  Dau  and  Cuerzo-Cazurra,  2014).  Our  research  focuses
n  a  more  ﬁne-grained  analysis  comparing  opportunity
ntrepreneurship,  which  is  far  more  related  to  economic
rowth,  with  necessity  entrepreneurship,  and  which  usually
rises  because  of  the  lack  of  labor  alternatives.  Our  main
esult  is  that  increased  development  of  formal  institutions
ot  only  favors  opportunity  entrepreneurship,  but  also  its
elative  presence.  This  is  an  interesting  conclusion  that  has
ot  been  tested  before,  although  similar  results  have  been
btained  theoretically  in  works  such  as  Baumol  (1990)  or
aumol  and  Strom  (2007).
From  the  point  of  view  of  public  policies,  it  would
e  of  interest  for  policymakers  to  provide  a  frame-
ork  that  channels  entrepreneurial  efforts  toward  those
essi
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activities  that  have  positive  effects  on  economic  growth.
The  aim  is  not  only  to  increase  the  rate  of  entrepreneur-
ship  indiscriminately,  but  also  to  focus  it  on  innovative
activities  with  higher  added  value  that  are  more  prone  to
create  jobs  (Shane,  2009).  An  institutional  context  where
the  rules  of  the  game  are  clearer  would  increase  opportunity
entrepreneurship,  with  the  subsequent  effect  on  economic
activity.
Our  research  has  several  limitations  that  may
constitute  avenues  for  further  research.  First,  the
opportunity--necessity  dichotomy  can  be  interpreted
differently  depending  on  the  country  in  question.  It  is
true  that  GEM  methodology  tries  to  be  uniform  in  the
regions  where  the  study  is  conducted,  but  the  concept
of  opportunity  may  differ  from  one  country  to  another.
Second,  this  dichotomy  could  be  slightly  restrictive  by
ignoring  other  classiﬁcations,  such  as  commercial  versus
social  entrepreneurship,  or  formal  versus  informal,  which
are  also  interesting  to  analyze.
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